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rights which the fourteenth amendment has been held to afford.60
Emilia M. Naccarato

ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAWS

EPTL § 3-4.3: Separation agreement containing general release
of rights held insufficient to revoke specific will bequests to
spouse
EPTL § 3-4.3 provides that any conveyance, settlement, or other
60The principle establishing a liberty interest of familial integrity evolved from the
fourteenth amendment due process clause of the United States Constitution. In the seminal
case of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
state law prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to a child not yet in the eighth grade
because it deprived parents of their due process liberty to "establish a home and bring up
children." Id. at 399. Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the
Supreme Court noted that parents have the right to direct their children's education free
from unreasonable state interference. Id. at 518-19. Recently, the Court in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), upon upholding the right of Amish parents to instill their own
religious beliefs in their children, held that such parents were not required to comply with
compulsory education laws. Id. at 213-14. This analysis has been extended to the right of a
parent to custody where the family unit is of paramount concern. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651, 658 (1972). Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has viewed the family
as protected by the due process liberty interest and has upheld parent's rights to raise their
families. See Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 193, 272 N.E.2d 567, 570, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71, 75
(1971); People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 468, 113 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1953);
People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952); People ex
rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 287, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1936) (per curiam).
Additionally, the Supreme Court has articulated a fundamental right to privacy implicit
in the due process liberty clause. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (right
of privacy includes a married couple's use of contraception). Subsequently, the basis for
many family protection decisions was the fundamental right of privacy. This right, however,
was extended only to situations directly affecting the marital relationship. In Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), the Supreme Court noted that the constitution protects individuals
in "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education." Id.; e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(constitution protects sanctity of the family); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639-40 (1974) (woman has a right to determine whether to bear a child); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (woman has a right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (constitution guarantees the right to marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (fundamental right to marry and procreate). See
generally Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential
Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rv.1, 31-62 (1980). Notwithstanding the fundamental right of
privacy, the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), stated that "reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed." Id. at 386. This holding recognizes that domestic relations is "an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States."
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
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act of a testator which is "wholly inconsistent" with a previous testamentary disposition acts as a revocation of the prior disposition.6 1 Although it is well-settled that a separation agreement does
not, in and of itself, revoke testamentary dispositions in a prior
wil,6

6,

2

it has been unclear whether a clause within such an agree-

EPTL

§

3-4.3 provides:

A conveyance, settlement or other act of a testator by which an estate in his property, previously disposed of by will, is altered but not wholly divested does not
revoke such disposition, but the estate in the property that remains in the testator
passes to the beneficiaries pursuant to the disposition. However, any such conveyance, settlement or other act of the testator which is wholly inconsistent with such
previous testamentary disposition revokes it.
EPTL § 3-4.3 (1981). EPTL § 3-4.3 is a reenactment of sections 39 and 40 of the Decedent
Estate Law which were originally enacted as part of the Revised Statutes of 1829. 9 RoHAN,
N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE 1 3-4.3[1], at 3-210.3 n.2.7 (1981). In creating EPTL § 3-4.3, the revisors omitted the portion of section 39 of the Decedent Estate Law which stipulated that a
transaction which merely alters the testator's interest shall not be deemed a revocation of
the devise or bequest of such property "unless in the instrument by which such alteration is
made, the intention is declared that it shall operate as a revocation of such previous devise
or bequest." DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 39 (McKinney 1949) (repealed 1967). This stipulation
is inconsistent with EPTL § 3-4.1, which requires that a revocatory instrument be executed
with the same formalities as set forth in EPTL § 3-2.1 for the execution of wills. See 9
ROHAN, N.Y. CvL PRACTICE 3-4.3[1], at 3-210.3 (1981). See generally EPTL §§ 3-2.1, 3-4.1
(1981). EPTL § 3-4.3 does carry over from section 40 of the Decedent Estate Law "the
principle that a conveyance settlement, or other act of the testator which is 'wholly inconsistent' with a previous testamentary disposition revokes it." 9 RoHAN, N.Y. CIVm PRACTICE 1
3-4.3[1], at 3-210.3 (1981); In re Estate of Maruccia, 78 App. Div. 2d 321, 321-22, 434
N.Y.S.2d 678, 678 (lst Dep't), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 196, 429 N.E.2d 751, 445 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1981);
In re Estate of Fisher, 109 Misc. 2d 563, 565, 440 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520 (Sur. Ct. Broome
County 1981); Estate of Reckseit, N.Y.L.J., May 24, 1979, at 13, cols. 4-5 (Sur. Ct. Nassau
County).
The Revised Statutes of 1829 were passed to overcome the common law rule which
required that the interest which the testator had in the subject of the devise when he made
his will should remain unchanged until his death. See 9 ROHAN, N.Y. CIvm PRACICE 1 34.3[1], at 3-210.1 (1981) (citing Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35, 53 (1850)). Even a minor alteration in the relationship between the testator and the subject matter of the prior specific
bequest or devise constituted an automatic revocation of such bequest or devise by implication. Id. Occasionally, this common-law rule defeated the intentions of testators. See, e.g.,
Beck v. McGillis, 9 Barb. 35, 53 (1850).
62 See In re Hollister, 18 N.Y.2d 281, 286, 221 N.E.2d 376, 378, 274 N.Y.S.2d 585, 588
(1966); In re Estate of Crounse, 168 Misc. 359, 361, 6 N.Y.S.2d 32, 35 (Sur. Ct. Albany
County 1938); Hoffman, Revocation of Wills and Related Subjects, 32 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1,
15 (1965). A divorce, annulment, or declaration of nullity or dissolution of marriage, however, automatically revokes any disposition or appointment of property made by a prior will.
EPTL § 5-1.4 (1981). EPTL § 5-1.4 creates a conclusive presumption, absent an express
provision to the contrary, that the parties intended that the will be revoked. See 9 RoHAN,
N.Y. Civ-,L PRACTICE 5-1.411], at 5-244 (1981). EPTL § 5-1.4 reversed the previously settled
law of New York that a divorce or an annulment did not expressly or impliedly revoke a
prior will. See, e.g., In re Hollister, 18 N.Y.2d 281, 287, 221 N.E.2d 376, 378, 274 N.Y.S.2d
585, 589 (1966) (divorce); In re Will of De Nardo, 268 App. Div. 865, 865-66, 50 N.Y.S.2d
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ment which serves as a general release of a spouse's rights against
the other's estate will revoke the other spouse's prior will bequests.6 3 Recently, in In re Estate of Maruccia," the Court of Appeals held that a general release is not sufficient to revoke prior
will bequests and that, instead, the agreement must either contain
a provision whereby the spouse explicitly renounces any testamentary disposition in his or her favor made prior to the date of the
561, 561 (2nd Dep't 1944) (annulments); In re Sussdorf, 182 Misc. 69, 70, 43 N.Y.S.2d 760,
761 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1943) (divorce). Prior to EPTL § 5-1.4, New York case law
provided for no revocation in cases of divorce because the courts took the position that the
then existing statutory provisions for revocation were exclusive. 182 Misc. at 71, 43 N.Y.S.2d
at 762 ("the common law doctrine of implied revocation of wills by reason of subsequent
changes in the condition or circumstances of a testator does not prevail in this State." (citations omitted)). For a discussion of a revocation of wills by operation of law, see Hoffman,
Revocation of Wills and Related Subjects, 32 BROoKLYN L. REv. 1, 33 (1965).
63 Compare In re Estate of Coffed, 46 N.Y.2d 514, 520, 387 N.E.2d 1209, 1211, 414
N.Y.2d 893, 895 (1979) with In re Hollister, 18 N.Y.2d 281, 286, 221 N.E.2d 376, 378, 274
N.Y.S.2d 585, 588 (1966). In Hollister,the separation agreement provided that the husband
released "any and all right, title and interest in and to the property or estate of the Wife
(whether now owned or hereafter acquired), her executors and administrators, heirs at law
and next of kin, which the husband now has or may have including any right to take against
her will under section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law." 18 N.Y.2d at 286, 221 N.E.2d at 378,
274 N.Y.S.2d at 588. The Court of Appeals ruled that this language was wholly inconsistent
with the survival of testamentary gifts to the husband. Id. The concurrence stated, however,
that "[t]he question of what language in a separation agreement shall have the effect of a
revocation of a prior testamentary disposition ... does not appear to have been decided by
this court." Id. at 287, 221 N.E.2d at 379, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 589 (Keating, J., concurring). In
Coffed, the issue was whether a reciprocal will may be revoked by a general release which
discharges the testator's contractual obligation to execute such a will. 46 N.Y.2d at 517, 387
N.E.2d at 1209,414 N.Y.S.2d at 894. The appellant argued that the will should be impliediy
revoked in accordance with Hollister.Id. at 519, 387 N.E.2d at 1211, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
The Court of Appeals, however, distinguished Hollisteron its facts and noted that the viability of the Hollister decision "may be in doubt." Id. at 520, 387 N.E.2d at 1211, 414
N.Y.S.2d at 895. Subsequent to the Coffed decision, the Nassau County Surrogate followed
the Hollisterrule, declaring a separation agreement "wholly inconsistent" with the terms of
a prior will. Estate of Reckseit, N.Y.L.J., May 24, 1979, at 13, cols. 4-5 (Sur. Ct. Nassau
County). In Reckseit, Surrogate Bennett held that a separation agreement, in which the
parties released all right to elect and inherit in intestacy, effected a revocation within EPTL
§ 3-4.3. Id. The separation agreement provided that each party waived, released, and
relinquished
all rights of election against the will of the other party, and all rights to act as
administratorof the other party's estate; provided that nothing herein shall preclude either party from making voluntaryprovision for the other party by his or
her Last Will and Testament.
Id. at col. 4-5 (emphasis supplied by court). From this language, Surrogate Bennett found
that "[i]t [was] evident that ... [in the] instant case both the parties intended to waive any
and all rights not only in intestacy but also under the terms of each others will." Id. at col.
5.
54 N.Y.2d 196, 429 N.E.2d 751, 445 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1981), af'g 78 App. Div. 2d 321, 434
N.Y.S.2d 678 (1st Dep't).
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separation agreement or employ language which "clearly and unequivocally manifests an intent" to revoke prior testamentary
dispositions. 5
In Maruccia, the decedent had executed a will in 1966 which
contained several specific bequests to his then second wife.6 6 In
1976, the decedent and his wife executed a separation agreement
which included a general release waiving any right of either spouse
to the property or estate of the other.6 7 The decedent thereafter
died without either obtaining a divorce or rewriting his will, and a
dispute arose as to whether the general release abrogated his bequest to his second wife. 8 Surrogate Midonick, relying primarily
9 deterupon the Court of Appeal's decision in In re Hollister,"
mined that the general release was wholly inconsistent with the
prior will bequests in favor of the decedent's wife and, therefore,
concluded that the bequests had been revoked.70 The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, holding that the provisions of
the separation agreement merely released statutory rights and
were not "wholly inconsistent" with the voluntary bequests of the
54 N.Y.2d at 205, 429 N.E.2d at 754, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
Id. at 200, 429 N.E.2d at 751-52, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 73-74.
67 54 N.Y.2d at 200, 429 N.E.2d at 752, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 74. The separation agreement
provided that the husband would make certain payments to his second wife through 1981,
assign to her his 200 shares of common stock in the First National Bank of Florida, and
acknowledge that a mortgage on certain New York realty belonged solely to the second wife.
Id. His second wife was required to transfer to the husband certain stock in his real estate
corporation, execute a quitclaim deed in decedent's favor covering certain Florida realty,
and assign to decedent her interest in their joint bank account and certificate of deposit. Id.
The release clause which appeared in article twelve of the agreement provided:
TWELFTH: Except as hereinbefore stated, each party hereto releases and
relinquishes to the other party all claims or rights which may now exist or hereafter arise by reason of the marriage between the parties with respect to any property, whether real or personal, belonging to such other party and, without limiting
the foregoing, each party hereby waives and releases to the other party all right to
share in any of the property or estate of such other party which has arisen or may
hereafter arise by operation of the law or otherwise, and hereby specifically waives
and releases all right of dower or curtesy, or rights in lieu thereof, and all rights to
share in the estate of the other party under the intestacy laws of any jurisdiction
and all right of election to take against (a) any Last Will and Testament of such
other party whether executed prior or subsequent to the execution hereof or (b)
any testamentary substitute or inter vivos transfer made by the other party and
all right to administer the estate of such other party.
54 N.Y.2d at 200-01, 429 N.E.2d at 752, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
Id. at 201, 429 N.E.2d at 752, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
6- 18 N.Y.2d 281, 221 N.E.2d 376, 274 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966).
70 In re Estate of Maruccia, 54 N.Y.2d 196, 201-02, 429 N.E.2d 751, 752, 445 N.Y.S.2d
73, 74 (1981).
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testator.7 1

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.72 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Judge Jasen stated that in order for a separation
agreement to have a revocatory effect on prior testamentary dispositions, it must contain either explicit language renouncing the bequest or language which "clearly and unequivocally" reveals an intent to prevent the spouse from benefiting under the will.7

The

Court maintained that ambiguous phrases in a separation agreement which merely purport to waive all rights in an estate are
insufficient to indicate that a revocation of specific bequests was
intended.7 4 Indeed, Judge Jasen noted that the legislature had advocated both a narrow construction of waiver clauses and an adherence to the strict statutory requirements for validating and
amending wills. m The Court concluded that to the extent the Hol-

lister decision found a general release to be "wholly inconsistent"
with prior specific bequests, it should be overruled. 8
71

In re Estate of Maruccia, 78 App. Div. 2d 321, 323, 434 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (lst Dep't

1981).
54 N.Y.2d 196, 202, 429 N.E.2d 751, 753, 445 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75 (1981).
Id. at 205, 429 N.E.2d at 754, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 76. The Maruccia Court emphasized
that the term "wholly inconsistent" as used in EPTL § 3-4.3 supported a strict approach to
implied revocations. 54 N.Y.2d at 205, 429 N.E.2d at 754, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
7' Id. at 205-06, 429 N.E.2d at 755, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
75 Id. at 204-05, 429 N.E.2d at 754, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 76. Judge Jasen noted a concern of
the legislature that the judiciary should avoid decisions which weaken statutory requirements as to the revocation of testamentary dispositions. Rep. No. 8.2.5A, Fn'u REP. N.Y.
CoMEssIoN ON EsTATEs 435-36 (1966) [hereinafter cited as THE REPORT]. The Court also
noted that the legislature disfavored the revocation of a testamentary disposition when the
decedent had ample opportunity during his lifetime to revoke or amend the instrument. 54
N.Y.2d at 204-05, 429 N.E.2d at 754, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
Finally, the Maruccia Court commented upon the disparity among lower court decisions which had construed virtually identical waiver clause provisions. Id. at 203, 429 N.E.2d
at 753, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 75. Compare In re Estate of Nelson, 51 Misc. 2d 375, 376, 273
N.Y.S.2d 333, 334 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1966) with In re Will of Shack, 207 Misc. 953, 954,
140 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745, afi'd on reargument, 207 Misc. 953, 143 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1955). In Nelson, the separation agreement contained language which stated that
"[e]ach of the parties does hereby stipulate and agree that this agreement shall constitute a
waiver under Section 18 of the Decedent's Estate Law... of any right of election to take
against any Last Will and Testament of the other party, whether heretofore or hereafter
executed, and each party releases any and all interest and claim in the estate of the other
party." 51 Misc. 2d at 376, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 334. The court held this was a waiver of testamentary rights, but not a waiver of testamentary gifts. Id., 273 N.Y.S.2d at 335. In contrast,
the Shack court found that language which "waived any and all right to the estate of the
other" and further released and waived "all right to inherit under any will of the other" was
wholly inconsistent with a prior will. 207 Misc. at 954, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
76 54 N.Y.2d at 205, 429 N.E.2d at 754-55,445 N.Y.S.2d at 76-77. The Maruccia Court
stated that the language of article twelve of the separation agreement, see note 67 supra,
72
7-
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It is submitted that the Maruccia Court's holding that a general release in a separation agreement is insufficient to revoke a
prior will bequest is founded upon a mistaken interpretation of
discordant legislative objectives. Concededly, the meticulous drafting of agreements and the timely redrafting of wills are two important legislative concerns and, as such, should be accommodated.7
Nevertheless, the legislature also has recognized that individuals
often are not as expeditious as they should be in updating their
wills and, mindful of the significant change in circumstances
wrought by divorce, has provided for automatic revocation of bequests upon divorce.78 It is suggested that the latter, not the forindicated that the parties deliberately had avoided any reference to the voluntary bequests
in the will. 54 N.Y.2d at 205, 429 N.E.2d at 755, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 77. The Court also suggested that sound legal practice would dictate that when a party was legally separated, his
will should be amended to reflect his changed intentions. Id. at 206, 429 N.E.2d at 755, 445
N.Y.S.2d at 77 (citing EPTL § 3-4.1, commentary at 526 (1981)).
Notably, in the course of espousing a strict standard for the revocation of prior testamentary dispositions, the Maruccia decision reaffirmed that a conveyance or other act of a
testator which is wholly inconsistent with a prior disposition in a will revokes it. 54 N.Y.2d
at 203, 429 N.E.2d at 753, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 75. Thus, the Court of Appeals has withdrawn its
formerly undecided stand on this issue. See In re Estate of Coffed, 46 N.Y.2d 514, 520, 387
N.E.2d 1209, 1211, 414 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1979). Nevertheless, Maruccia marks a departure
from previous case law which attempted to discern the intentions of the parties through an
analysis of the language of the separation agreement and the surrounding circumstances.
See, e.g., In re Will of Shack, 207 Misc. 953, 956, 143 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1955); In re Will of Cote, 195 Misc. 410, 416, 87 N.Y.S.2d 555, 560 (Sur. Ct. Broome
County 1949); In re Estate of Gilmour, 146 Misc. 113, 115, 260 N.Y.S. 761, 762 (Sur. Ct. St.
Lawrence County 1932). In Shack, the court allowed a separation agreement, which mutually waived any and all right to the estate of the other and further released and waived all
right to inherit under any will of the other, to revoke a prior will, stating that "the construction of such a contract is for the court." A fundamental rule in the construction thereof is
the ascertainment of the intent of the parties. 207 Misc. at 956, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 56. In Cote,
the court, refusing to revoke a prior will where the separation agreement waived statutory
rights, stated that "[i]n order to reach the conclusion that ... provisions of the separation
agreement are 'wholly inconsistent' with the provisions of the will, we are required to determine the sufficiently expressed intent derivable from an examination of the separation
agreement in all its aspects and, also, in the light of circumstances surrounding its execution." 195 Misc. at 416, 87 N.Y.S.2d at 560. In Gilmour, the court stated that "[ijn interpreting and construing written instruments, recognition is given not only to the letter, but
to the spirit of the instrument; that is, what did the parties really intend." 146 Misc. at 115,
260 N.Y.S. at 762.
7 See THE REPORT, supra note 75, at 435-36.
78 EPTL § 5-1.4 (1981); see note 63 supra. EPTL § 5-1.4 was adopted in recognition of
the strong presumption that, in the case of a divorce or annulment, the testator no longer
wished previous testamentary dispositions to the other spouse to be effective. See 9 P.
ROHAN, N.Y. Cwvm PRACTIcE 1 5-1.4[1], at 5-244 (1981) (quoting THE REPORT, supra note 75,
at 464). Indeed, before the adoption of EPTL § 5-1.4, divorce was a major factor in finding
that the testator had intended to revoke his prior will at the time of entering the separation
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mer, legislative policy should control the status of testamentary
dispositions insofar as divorce and separation are concerned.
Another persuasive factor militating against the Maruccia
Court's decision is-the increasing use of separation agreements as
predicates for divorce.79 Surely, an agreement to revoke prior testamentary dispositions properly may be inferred when parties, who
have entered into an agreement for the sole purpose of obtaining a
divorce, have, as an additional measure, provided for the disposition of property and a general release of rights. Given the contrary
position of the Maruccia Court, however, it is hoped that the legislature will act to sanction the revocatory effect of such general
releases.80
Edward Kelly
agreement. See, e.g., In re Hollister, 18 N.Y.2d 281, 288, 221 N.E.2d 376, 379, 274 N.Y.S.2d
585, 590 (1966) (Keating, J., concurring); In re Will of Shack, 207 Misc. 953, 954, 140
N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1955); In re Will of Ga Nun, 200 Misc. 789, 792,
104 N.Y.S.2d 344, 348 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 982, 112 N.Y.S.2d
324 (1st Dep't 1952); In re Gilmour, 146 Misc. 113, 115, 260 N.Y.S. 761, 762 (Sur. Ct. St.
Lawrence County 1932).
In adopting EPTL § 5-1.4, the legislature rejected the argument that a testator who did
not amend his will after divorce, although he had ample opportunity, intended that it remain in effect. The legislature stated "[t]he reliance in the cases on the argument that the
testator's failure to revoke or alter his will after divorce or annulment, particularly where a
long period intervenes the rendition of the decree and death, is not convincing in light of the
concededly lax tendencies of the public with respect to the making or reviewing of wills." 9
P. ROHAN N.Y. PRAcTxcE 5-1.4[1], at 5-244 (1981) (quoting THE REPoRT, supra note 75).
Compare In re Estate of Nelson, 51 Misc. 2d 375, 376, 273 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (Sur. Ct. Erie
County 1966) with In re Estate of Gilmour, 146 Misc. 2d 113, 115, 260 N.Y.S. 761, 762 (Sur.
Ct. St. Lawrence County 1932). In Nelson, the court assumed that a prior will remained in
effect since the testator did not amend his will after entering a separation agreement, although he had ample opportunity. 51 Misc. 2d at 376, 273 N.Y.2d at 335. In Gilmour, the
court rejected such reasoning, stating that the separation agreement revoked the will when
the testator did not amend it, although he had ample opportunity. The court stated that it
was more logical that the testator would have amended the will only if he intended that it
remain in effect. 146 Misc. 2d at 115, 260 N.Y.S. at 763. It is submitted that a testator who
enters a separation agreement and subsequently does not modify his will, although ample
time exists, does not necessarily intend for his prior will to continue in effect.
79 The Domestic Relations Law provides that an action for a divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife when "[t]he husband and wife have lived separate and apart
pursuant to a written agreement of separation.., for a period of one or more years after
the execution of the agreement." DRL § 170(6) (1977). Such an agreement often is used as a
ground for divorce when the parties mutually consent to end the marriage, since the mere
execution of the agreement is implied consent to a divorce by either a year later. See Foster
& Freed, Divorce in the Fifty States, 13 FAm. L.Q. 105, 113 (1978).
so One commentator has suggested that EPTL § 5-1.4 be revised to provide that a separation agreement accomplish the same results that divorce, dissolution, or annulment of the
marriage now accomplishes, namely, automatic revocation. Midonick, Multiple Spouse
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INSURANCE LAW

Ins. Law § 673(2): No-fault insurer's action for recovery of firstparty benefits deemed an independent action which accrues 2
years after injury if insured has failed to bring suit
When an insurer has paid benefits to its insured as compensation for an injury sustained by the insured, the common-law right
of subrogation generally permits the insurer to bring suit against
the third party whose conduct caused the injury.8 ' The insurer as
subrogee "steps into the shoes" of its insured, succeeding to all the
rights and privileges which the insured possessed.82 Conversely,
Problems Surface to Determinationin Surrogate Court Issues, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1981, at
19, col. 1, 27, col. 2. "The recent addition as a ground for divorce of the mere existence of a
valid written separation agreement after the agreement has endured for one year, should
lead to a strong or conclusive presumption, absent express contrary intention in the separation agreement or will, that the soon-to-be former spouse be cut off from all participation in
the estate." Id. Nevertheless, it is submitted that a presumption should be entertained only
when the separation agreement contains a general release and is filed with the intention of
obtaining a later divorce.
" The doctrine of subrogation in insurance arises from "general principles of equity." 8
G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1997, at 6590 (1931). It may be defined broadly
as the substitution of one who has paid another's debt into the place of the creditor. Id. §
1996, at 6587. The insurer, upon payment of an insured's loss, is subrogated to the insured's
cause of action against anyone responsible for the loss. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246
N.Y. 162, 164, 158 N.E. 60, 61 (1927); see 6A J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw
AND PRACTcE § 4051 (1972). Almost all standard form insurance policies provide for the
insurer's right to subrogation despite the fact that the right attaches without any formal
stipulation. See Am. Jun. INSURANCE § 1335 (1940); G. COUCH, supra, § 1996, at 6588. Moreover, it is generally accepted that the right to subrogation does not inure to the insurer until
it has paid a claim under a policy. J.A. APPLmAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra, § 4051, at 112; see,
e.g., Safeguard Ins. Co. v. Rosen', 39 App. Div. 2d 851, 851, 332 N.Y.S.2d 963, 964 (1st Dep't
1972) (per curiam), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 1054, 295 N.E.2d 189, 342 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1973); Krause
v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 353, 355, 279 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (let
Dep't 1967), aff'd, 22 N.Y.2d 147, 239 N.E.2d 175, 292 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1968). In order to be
subrogated, however, the insurer must not be acting as a volunteer and must be secondarily
liable when it pays the claim of its insured. 11 J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra, § 6501.
82 11 J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, supra note 81, § 6505, at 444; see John Wanamaker, New York, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 228 N.Y. 192, 201, 126 N.E. 718, 720-21 (1920).
"A first party insurer's rights are based on and derived from its insured's rights and no more
.... " State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Regional Transit Serv., Inc., 79 App. Div. 2d 858,
859, 434 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (4th Dep't 1980); see St. Vincent's Medical Center v. Vincent E.
Iorio, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 968, 969, 358 N.Y.S.2d 993, 994 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1974);
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 63 Misc. 2d 690, 693, 313 N.Y.S.2d 200, 203 (Sup. Ct.
-Niagara County 1970). An insurer not only acquires its insured's cause of action through
subrogation, but also any "rights, priorities, remedies, liens, and securities" held by the subrogor. 16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 61:36 (2d ed. 1966). The purpose of
allowing such suits is to compel the wrongdoer to bear the ultimate cost for his behavior and
to prevent the insured from recovering from both his insurer and the tortfeasor for the same
injury. Scinta v. Kazmierczak, 59 App. Div. 2d 313, 316, 399 N.Y.S.2d 545, 548 (4th Dep't

